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This paper discusses the importance of and a solution to separating the information flow from the physical product flow in 
a supply chain. Motivated by the inefficient demand forecast caused by information asymmetry and lack of an incentive 
among supply chain partners to share valuable information, we propose a radically new framework called collective 
outsourcing to market (COM) to address many information supply chain design challenges. To validate the COM 
framework, we consider a supply chain with one manufacturer and multiple downstream retailers. Retailers privately 
acquire demand forecast information that they do not have incentive to share horizontally with other retailers or vertically 
with the upstream manufacturer. We consider two alternative market mechanisms that can be used to outsource the 
information-intensive demand forecasting task for the whole supply chain. The specially organized market can be viewed 
as a cost effective way of acquiring quality information that, at the same time, aligns individual retailers’ incentives to 
credibly share their private information. We further discuss the real world implementation issues including market design 
and the costs and benefits of proposed solutions.   
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1. Introduction 
Unarguably, demand forecasting plays a critical role in supply chain management. Companies now 
invest aggressively in software and consulting in order to acquire more relevant information and 
produce better forecasts. However, in current practice, supply chain partners independently manage 
their forecasting activities and are extremely unwilling to disclose their forecasts to other supply chain 
partners in order to maintain their own competitive advantages. The overall supply chain does not 
benefit from individual companies’ information acquisition. Even though researchers have addressed 
the benefits of information sharing in supply chain management, how to provide the chain partners 
with the correct incentives to conduct their demand forecasting activities in a more cost-effective way 
and in a way that benefits the entire supply chain remains a challenging task. This paper proposes a 
general framework to induce collective information acquisition and demand forecast sharing using 
market mechanisms. We suggest that outsourcing the forecasting activity to a dedicated market can 
improve efficiency and willingness to share, and we call this novel framework collective outsourcing to 
market (COM). 
 
In a supply chain, the uncertain market demands of individual firms are usually driven by some 
macro-level, industry-related or economy-related environmental factors. Individually managed 
demand forecasts cause supply chain inefficiency in three ways. First, supply chain partners invest 
repeatedly in acquiring highly correlated demand information, which increases the overall cost of 
demand forecasting. Second, the quality of individual forecasts is generally sub-optimal, since 
individual companies have only limited access to information sources and limited ability to process 
them, which results in less accurate forecasts and inefficient decision making. Third, but not least, 
firms vary in their capability to produce good quality forecasts. Significant information asymmetry 
leads to strategic plays and has been reported to be the main reason for many coordination failures, 
such as the well-known “bullwhip” effect (Lee et al., 1997).  
 
In this paper, we propose an innovative way to reorganize the demand forecasting process so as to 
benefit the whole supply chain. Our proposed COM solution consists of two key elements. First, we 
propose that companies collectively outsource the process of demand forecasting, especially the 
correlated part of the demand, to a specialized independent third party. The third party can undertake 
the task, manage the budget and consulting resources for the companies, and integrate available 
pieces of information into an overall accurate forecast. Second, we propose that the information third 
party adopt market mechanisms to create incentive-aligned information sharing among the supply 
chain partners, provide trust inside the supply chain, and aggregate dispersed information from 
various information sources. 
 
The idea of adopting outsourcing to induce efficiency is not new in supply chain practice. In a 
technological environment characterized by rapid innovation, original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) outsource asset-intensive production to contract manufacturers who cut OEMs’ costs, free up 
capital, and improve productivity. Another innovative business process outsourcing (BPO) application 
is Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI), wherein vendors (the external service providers) who specialize 
in specific functional areas perform those functions for a company more efficiently at lower cost. 
Likewise, the concept of BPO in supply chain management would shift information intensive 
processes to external service providers, with the intention of improving decision making in firms with 
limited information processing capabilities (Mani et al., 2006). Our proposed COM framework builds 
on this trend and suggests that outsourcing can collectively improve information quality in the 
information sharing process and facilitate supply chain coordination. In our COM framework, supply 
chain efficiency can be achieved both by economies of scale and by tapping the expertise and 
investments of a service provider who focuses solely on that process. In addition, the collective 
outsourcing framework requires firms to commit to information sharing via the market reward 
mechanism, which is a challenging task when the demand forecast is produced in-house. 
 
As to the mechanism that can be used to manage market-type relationships and encourage 
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cooperation and efficiency in the process of supply chain information outsourcing, the prediction 
market is one viable concept. Cowles (1933) concluded that expert forecasters could not improve the 
accuracy of forecasts derived from the actions of a market, and other research findings have 
generally supported this conclusion. In addition, some recent applications have validated the role of 
markets in effective information aggregation, including innovations in financial markets, betting on 
sporting events, and prediction markets.  
 
Particularly, a prediction market is an emerging market type that is designed with the sole purpose of 
forecasting future events. Prediction markets trade specially designed contingent contracts whose 
payoff depends on the outcomes of certain future events. These markets are usually set up as online 
futures markets and have trading processes that essentially resemble those of existing stock 
exchanges such as continuous time double auctions. Traders buy or sell contingent contracts based 
on their private predictions of the future value of the contracts (i.e., the outcome of future events). The 
market price of the contingent contracts fluctuates according to the traders’ activities and integrates 
all the traders’ predictions into an aggregate forecast. Prototypes of such markets were used in 
predicting the most recent presidential election outcome (the Iowa Electronic Market, 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem) and forecasting movie sales (Hollywood Stock Exchange Market, 
http://www.hsx.com). (Please refer to Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) for a comprehensive review of 
prediction markets.) Hewlett-Packard has already pioneered business applications in sales 
forecasting and now uses internal prediction markets in several business units (Foroohar, 2003). A 
handful of large companies, such as IBM, Microsoft, and Ford, are eager to join market experiments 
that utilize their predictive power. The impact of prediction markets on science and business is 
becoming more and more evident. 
 
In addition to the double auction mechanisms mentioned above, some researchers have suggested 
other types of prediction markets where contingent contracts are explicitly priced before the market 
opens. The price takes into account the fact that the traders need to incur costs to acquire good 
information, and the market rewards the traders if the information is, in fact, of good quality. Chen et 
al. (2001, 2004) have used logarithmic reward functions to show that the market (combined with other 
design features) can integrate information when traders are risk-averse or when traders’ information 
has some correlation. Fang et al. (2007) have suggested a special family of quadratic reward 
functions that can reveal not only the traders’ private forecasts but their beliefs on forecast accuracy. 
Such a market mechanism can be adopted when traders have heterogeneous abilities and non-
negligible costs to acquire and process information.  
 
Although different market reward structures can be constructed to achieve the specific information 
acquisition and aggregation objectives, choosing the underlying market instrument is a nontrivial task. 
Guo et al. (2006) have suggested the use of a futures contract written on a macro-level index that will 
affect the demand of all the retailers in a supply chain setting. The innovative idea of creating a 
macro-level index for the supply chain demand forecasting purpose has far extended the scope of 
current prediction market applications. This paper extends Guo et al. (2006) to a collective 
outsourcing framework and carefully studies the role of the information third party in designing, 
managing, and implementing proper market solutions. This paper also examines the conditions under 
which firms can use pre-priced betting markets to produce reliable and accurate predictions in 
different business environments. More specifically, we discuss an alternative market design 
demonstrated in Fang et al. (2007) to address different information elicitation and aggregation 
challenges under different informational assumptions. 
 
Our major contribution can be briefly summarized as a new supply chain outsourcing initiative 
enabled by an innovative market-based information revelation and aggregation mechanism. We 
specifically focus on one important challenge in the information supply chain design – the demand 
forecasting process – that is traditionally conducted in-house and is viewed as private knowledge and 
a source of competitive advantage. Our market design provides supply chain partners with an 
attractive venue to implicitly outsource their demand forecasting functions. The COM framework is 
viewed as a cost effective way to collectively outsource such an information-intensive task and 
achieve consensus among supply chain partners in truthful and effective information sharing.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 outlines 
our COM framework. We first illustrate the market mechanism design and demonstrate the value of 
collective outsourcing in the information supply chain using a framework adopted by Guo et al. 
(2006). We then extend our model to a different information scenario using an alternative betting 
market design proposed by Fang et al. (2007). In Section 4, we compare the two market designs and 
discuss the market implementation issues. We conclude our paper in Section 5. 
2. Related Literature 
Extensive work in the supply chain literature has addressed the problem of asymmetric information 
and the importance of information sharing. For example, the well-known bullwhip effect (Lee et al., 
1997) refers to the information distortion in the supply chain due to separate ownership of information. 
It has been viewed as a major source of inefficiency in forecast-driven distribution channels, and 
information sharing has been widely recognized as a solution to alleviate the bullwhip effect (Chen et 
al. 2000). Cachon and Fisher (2000) showed that full information sharing lowers supply chain total 
cost by 2.2 percent, on average. Since demand forecasting is a significant part of the information 
sharing process, Aviv (2001) explored the benefit of sharing forecasts of future demand. Li (2002) 
showed that the information leakage concern discourages retailers from sharing their demand 
information with manufacturers. Therefore, how to implement truthful information sharing, and in 
particular, demand forecast sharing, remains a challenge.  
 
The existing supply chain literature has explored various design possibilities for complicated contracts 
among chain partners hoping that self-interested retailers will see that it is in their best interests to 
release their private information. Whang and Zou (2003) proposed to use spot market trading of 
commodities as an opportunity to share information about demand uncertainty and readjust inventory 
positions. Shin and Tunca (2006) studied a variety of contract forms and concluded that some 
traditional contracts, such as wholesale price contracts, quadratic contracts, and two-part tariffs, lead 
retailers to over-invest in their demand forecasts when they are competing for market demand in a 
Cournot fashion. As an incentive-compatible solution, they proposed a so-called “market-based” 
contracting, where each retailer’s price depends not only on her own order quantity but also on the 
order quantities submitted by other retailers. Their proposed solution resembles a VCG (Vickrey, 
1961; Clarke, 1971; and Groves, 1973) type payment rule that ties the price one pays to the total 
demand for the product (Bergemann and Välimäki, 2002). Each retailer needs to “conjecture 
correctly” others’ orders to decide her optimal quantities. This assumption is too demanding, if not 
entirely unrealistic, in real contract design and implementation.  
 
There are three potential problems with the “contracting” solution. First, the existence of an incentive-
compatible contract is sensitive to how the information is distributed among the retailers. In fact, all of 
the papers above assume that retailers are homogeneous in both their ability to acquire information 
and their ex-ante demand distribution. It is not clear whether their results can be generalized to 
heterogeneous retailers. Second, in order to achieve truthful information sharing, the manufacturer 
has to write and enforce individual specific contracts contingent on the orders from all participating 
retailers, which unarguably complicates the contract management issue. Since the information-
revealing equilibrium requires a large number of participants, the contracting cost will be prohibitive. 
Third, the solution attempts to manage the information flow along with the physical product orders. It 
generally focuses on collecting information from supply chain partners and ignores the fact that there 
are outside sources that may provide better information in a more cost-effective way. Since the 
traditional supply chain is managed in a closed-loop community, the “contracting” solution lacks the 
flexibility to acquire and aggregate all the available information relevant for decision making.   
 
In contrast, our approach emphasizes the importance of an independent information management 
scheme in the supply chain. We introduce an independent third party that manages a prediction 
market to trade a macroeconomic index whose future payoff depends on the realization of a macro 
factor correlated with the supply chain demand forecast goal. The idea of trading a macro index is 
consistent with observations that a firm’s demand has a strong correlation with some financial index 
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(Gaur and Seshadri, 2005). However, different from the preexisting publicly traded macroeconomic 
index, we allow the trading instrument to be constructed and tailored to the supply chain-specific 
demand forecast needs. Under our framework, demand uncertainty information can be revealed early 
and be incorporated into the supply chain partners’ contract specifications. Our solution is robust to 
both the information and physical structures of the supply chain. That is, we allow retailers who have 
access to various sources of information to participate in and benefit from the trading platform 
because the information flow is managed independently by a third party and does not intertwine with 
retailers’ physical orders. The prediction market also has the ability to incorporate outside information. 
The COM framework suggests a new business process outsourcing and reengineering approach that 
sheds some light on managing the information supply chain. 
 
The idea of business process outsourcing is supported by the literature in transaction cost theory, first 
coined by Coase (1937) and later generalized by Williamson (1979). It posits that certain economic 
tasks will be performed by firms, while others will be performed by the market, depending on the 
transaction cost of producing and distributing particular goods or services. Cost reduction and quality 
improvement are cited as the most important motivations for BPO (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani, 
1998). Information technologies have greatly reduced communication costs and increased inter-
organizational coordination efficiency, which make it possible for firms to source business processes 
from remote locations (Hagel and Singer, 1999). The literature has further suggested that firms with 
limited information processing capability need to employ BPO to collect and deliver quality information 
for decision making (Mani et al., 2006).  
 
In our proposed framework, the prediction market plays an important role in aggregating and 
integrating dispersed information sources. Prediction market mechanism design is an emerging 
research area with much potential in the business world. There are two different streams of research 
exploring how to construct the prediction market. One type of prediction market is structured similar to 
the stock market, where contracts contingent on the outcomes of future events are actively traded. 
Fama (1970) postulated that prices in such competitive markets reflect all available information. This 
is traditionally known as the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The theoretical foundation of the 
EMH concept is based on rational expectations equilibrium (REE) models (Muth, 1961). In general, 
this stream of literature, represented by market microstructure models (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; 
Kyle, 1985), analyzes price informativeness by linking prices to individual trading behaviors. Recently, 
research has focused on the reliability of the market price as a prediction vehicle (Spann and Skiera, 
2003; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). Experimental results suggest that prices perform well as 
forecasts regardless of the specific characteristics of the prediction market (i.e., the effectiveness of 
market price as the prediction device is independent of the types of events to be predicted, whether 
the trading asset is virtual or real money, etc.). The forecasting capability of price appears to be better 
than that of existing benchmark methods such as opinion polls (Berg et al., 2005) or surveys of 
experts (Chen and Plott, 2002). Therefore, the prediction market can be used to elicit particular 
information of interest with great accuracy. In addition, prediction markets are recommended to serve 
as decision support tools to aid effective decision making in organizations under various business 
environments (Berg and Rietz, 2003).  
 
Another research stream deviates from a zero-sum market game (in which informed traders with 
quality information earn positive expected profits at the cost of uninformed traders who do not 
possess good information) and links the market compensation mechanism with the cost of 
information acquisition. To our knowledge, Osband (1989) was among the first in this research stream 
to explicitly incorporate agent learning costs into a forecast elicitation model. The analysis suggests 
that organizations that operate on a “need-to-know” principle can reduce planning costs and control 
planning efficiency so that forecasting expertise is selected from among a handful of capable 
individuals. Chen et al. (2001, 2004) discussed incentive mechanisms to aggregate decentralized 
information within a small group to forecast the probability of a future event. Fang et al. (2007) 
proposed a novel betting mechanism to forecast the future value of a business subject when 
forecasters have heterogeneous ability to acquire signals with different precisions. Such a 
mechanism can motivate participants to incur certain costs to acquire relevant information. 
Decentralized information is aggregated efficiently, as the reliability of each forecast is utilized to 
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weigh each piece of information. With special attention to the cost of information acquisition, Fang et 
al. showed that the betting market needs to be externally subsidized to insure that every trader is 
appropriately rewarded and, consequently, truthfully reveals her private information.  
 
This paper builds and improves upon recent innovative research outcomes in the information systems 
and supply chain management fields. We discuss the design and implementation of different market 
mechanisms in the COM framework and aim to advance our understanding of both the opportunities 
and challenges in managing the market-based information supply chain. 
3. The Collective Outsourcing to Market (COM) Framework 
3.1 The General Framework 
In a dynamically changing marketplace, both the manufacturer and the retailers need to effectively 
forecast product demand to reduce their operation overhead. However, individually, each firm has 
limited capability in its demand forecasting. If each of the retailers chooses an outsourcing vendor to 
help with the demand forecast, they have to individually negotiate the outsourcing contracts. Not only 
do they lack the necessary negotiation power, but there is no guarantee that they will be able to find a 
quality service provider. By collectively outsourcing the demand forecasting function to a specialized 
third party service vendor, retailers can realize economies of scale and be assured of information 
quality.  
 
Figure 1. The COM Framework 
 
To demonstrate our collective outsourcing idea, we adopt a typical supply chain framework with one 
upstream manufacturer and multiple downstream retailers. Such a framework has been widely 
adopted in recent studies of supply chain coordination (e.g., Guo et al., 2006; Shin and Tunca, 2006; 
Wang and Zou, 2003). Figure 1 illustrates our general idea of separating the information flow from the 
physical product order flow. The information market acts as an information third party that is capable 
of eliciting and processing information from a variety of sources. Rather than negotiating a complex 
outsourcing contract on a one-to-one basis, the information third party designs a standard tradable 
contract and operates a market in which agents individually determine their respective outsourcing 
needs. To be specific, the tradable contract specifies a reward structure that is contingent on the 
future value of a macro economic factor that directly affects all retailers’ future market demand and, 
therefore, is related to their forecasting needs. We call the macro factor the retail index.  
 
The input to the information market can come from sources both inside and outside the supply chain. 
First, individual retailers usually obtain private forecasts about the retail index that are more accurate 
than those of the manufacturer, which may result from their closer observation of the market. 
Aggregation of such information can form a quality forecast that is better than any individual 
Supplier 
Information 
Third Party 
(Market)Information Sources 
outside the chain 
Physical product 
order flow 
 
Information flow 
Retailer 1 
Retailer 2 
… 
Retailer n 
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prediction. Second, the information market can collect additional relevant information from sources 
outside the supply chain. That is, the market can be opened to outside traders under certain 
conditions so as to attract more valuable inputs. The aggregated information revealed in the market 
can be used to aid the decision making of both the manufacturer and the retailers. To achieve this, the 
contract must be designed to reward traders according to the accuracy of their information after future 
uncertainty is resolved. Those with better information will be encouraged to provide inputs and can 
expect to earn positive payoffs.  
 
There are several important benefits of outsourcing to the information third party. The first benefit is its 
superior ability to process information and produce quality forecasts. The market has the ability to 
attract, analyze, and integrate all relevant information. It can extend the range of information 
elicitation beyond the physical supply chain boundary and hence increase its prediction power. The 
ability to absorb useful information from sources outside the supply chain is a unique feature of our 
model that is beyond the scope of traditional supply chain coordination research. 
 
Second, the COM framework can properly align incentives from different parties through its reward 
mechanism. Since the retailers who make better predictions can expect higher payoffs, the 
quantitative reward will induce retailers to express their own predictions based on the best of their 
knowledge.  
 
In addition, the market-based outsourcing contract can benefit all parties by reducing their agency 
costs. Agency costs refer to the additional efforts and costs incurred in managing contractual 
relationships such as monitoring the outsourcing vendor’s behavior and aligning the actions of the 
outsourcing vendor with the interests of the clients.  On the one hand, the performance of the third 
party service provider is guaranteed by the effectiveness of the market’s informational role. The 
commitment to credible information sharing is achieved automatically by the market’s ability to 
aggregate information through the market price formation process. The market outcome is 
independent of the action and self-interest of the third party vendor. On the other hand, the third party 
vendor is neutral in the supply chain. By interacting with the information third party, supply chain 
partners can avoid the potential for gaming and strategic concerns. Therefore, our proposed COM 
framework can address both the process uncertainty in supply chain management and relational 
uncertainty in traditional outsourcing contract design.  
 
Recent studies on prediction markets provide us with several mechanisms to consider in our COM 
framework. This paper discusses two major trends in prediction market mechanism design and the 
issue of choosing the appropriate mechanism under different supply chain forecasting environments.  
3.2 A Simple Supply Chain Framework 
In this section, we mathematically formulate the one-manufacturer-multiple-retailer supply chain to 
discuss the forecasting inefficiency in a decentralized supply chain environment. Then, in Sections 
3.3 and 3.4, we discuss the candidate market designs proposed in Guo et al. (2006) and Fang et al. 
(2007), respectively. In Section 3.5 we compare the two designs and discuss other potential market 
implementations. Appendix C provides a summary of all the mathematic notations used in Sections 
3.2 through 3.5. 
 
Assume that there are N geographically distributed retailers who order a homogeneous product from 
a manufacturer. Each retailer faces uncertain market demand that can be expressed as a linear 
function of a macro factor, X, representing the systematic risk with an identically and independently 
distributed error term ε i  capturing the idiosyncratic risk for retailer i : i i i iD a b X ε= + + , 
1, ,i N= L , where ia and ib are retailer-specific parameters that are common knowledge in the 
supply chain. We assume ( )
0
1
0~ ,X N s τ , ( )1~ 0,i N ετε  are both normally distributed.  
 
We further assume that each retailer can privately observe a noisy signal is  of the future value for 
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the macro economic factor, X x= . Specifically, we assume that i is x δ= +  where ( )1~ 0,
i
i N τδ is 
also identically and independently distributed, indicating the forecast error.1  
 
Ideally, if all retailers share their private forecasts truthfully among themselves and with the 
manufacturer, they will form a common belief on the uncertain macro factor X, i.e., 
{ } 0
0 0
1
1| , ~ ,
N
i i
i
N N
i i
i i
s
N
i i iX s N
τ
τ τ
τ =
= =
=
⎛ ⎞∑⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∑ ∑⎝ ⎠
. This aggregated forecast sharing scenario (indexed by “a”) provides 
us with a full information benchmark solution to evaluate the collective outsourcing efficiency. Another 
benchmark scenario is a fully decentralized supply chain model without forecast outsourcing (indexed 
by “d”). In the decentralized model, the information assumption is that individual retailers can only 
utilize their own signals to make order decisions. The manufacturer, however, has no private signal 
and can only rely on the common prior belief ( )
0
1
0~ ,X N s τ .  
 
We model the supply chain as a manufacturer Stackelberg game as follows. The manufacturer 
announces a wholesale price jw  ( ,j a d= ). All retailers simultaneously order an amount jiQ based 
on their own available information set jiF , for 1, ,i N= L . Specifically, let r be the retail price. Retailer 
i’s profit under scenario j is  ( ) ⎡ ⎤Π = −⎣ ⎦| min ,j j j jj jii i i iQ w r Q D w Q , for 1, ,i N= L . In the second 
stage, the retailer i chooses an order quantity jiQ  to maximize her expected profit, based on her 
information set jiF , where ( ){ }1, 2, ,ai NF s s s= L  and { }di iF s= . The retailer’s decision problem 
can be expressed as:  
   ( )
≥
⎡ ⎤Π⎣ ⎦0   | |ji
j j jj
i i i
Q
Max E Q w F , for = "1, ,i N .   (1) 
Let c be the unit production cost. The manufacturer’s profit ( )
=
Π = − ∑0
1
N
j jj
i
i
w c Q . In the first stage, 
the manufacturer maximizes her expected profit by choosing the wholesale price jw based on her 
expected order quantities from the retailers, conditional on her own information set 0
jF , where 
( ){ }0 1, 2, ,a NF s s s= L and 0dF = ∅ . The manufacturer’s decision problem is: 
    ( )0 0
0
  |
j
j jj
w
Max E w F
≥
⎡ ⎤Π⎣ ⎦ .    (2) 
To evaluate the efficiency of the supply chain coordination, we define 
0
N
jj
i
i
E E
=
Π Π∑  for ,j a d=  to 
represent the expected supply chain profit, which is calculated as the sum of profits gained by all the 
chain partners under the respective supply chain scenarios. 
 
Proposition 1: The expected supply chain profit in the aggregated scenario is higher than that in the 
decentralized scenario, i.e., a dE EΠ > Π . 
 
Proposition 1 shows that fully shared information helps improve overall supply chain efficiency by 
allowing chain partners to make better decisions. It also illustrates an outstanding supply chain 
coordination problem in a decentralized decision making environment. Therefore, from a social 
                                                     
1 In fact, the signal can be of any linear combination of the macro factor. For example, 
0 1 2i is xα α α δ= + + . We can always transfer such a signal si to a standardized 0
1
is
i is x
α
α δ−= = + %% , 
where 2
1
i i
α
αδ δ=% . 
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welfare perspective it is essential to construct incentive mechanisms that effectively attract all retailers 
to participate in the sharing paradigm – a collective information supply chain outsourcing. The real 
challenge, however, is that altruistic sharing rarely exists in real world settings. In the following, we 
discuss our proposed market-based mechanisms to address such fundamental issues as where the 
incentives come from and how to induce chain partners to share their private information truthfully. 
3.3 Outsourcing to an Index Market 
In this section, we discuss the information market mechanism design using the framework proposed 
in Guo et al. (2006). We show the influence of the market-based collective outsourcing on supply 
chain demand forecasting accuracy and its effect on the overall system efficiency.  
 
Guo et al. (2006) proposed a publicly traded macro index and proved the efficiency improvement of 
the overall supply chain under certain circumstances. One important assumption in the Guo et al. 
model is that the supply chain has a symmetric information structure, where all the retailers have 
similar abilities to produce their forecasts, yet no one is pivotal. That is, i δτ τ=  for 1,2, ,i N= " . 
Most existing literature that studies the supply chain coordination assumes a symmetric structure for 
tractability. We adopt this convention here to derive our major insights. In Section 3.4, we relax this 
assumption and discuss the possibility of designing a market mechanism to aggregate 
heterogeneous sources of information.  
 
The index market operates like an open book call futures market (Fan et al., 2002). Participants can 
buy or sell contingent contracts that pay $x if the future true value of the macro factor X x= . The 
current market price p is determined based on the participants’ respective sources of information. 
Market trading aggregates the initially locally available forecast information as if participants engage 
in collaborative forecasting projects under the market coordination. This is our COM scenario 
(indexed by j mi= ). 
 
The supply chain partners’ decision problems have the same form as described in Section 3.2. The 
only difference is the available information. In the second stage game, when a retailer orders from the 
manufacturer, she can not only look at her private signal is , but also can refer to the index market 
price p to find more information about other market participants’ perceptions of the future macro 
economic environment that will affect the demand. Therefore, the information set is expressed as 
{ },mii iF s p= , for 1,2, ,i N= " . In the first stage, the manufacturer makes a decision based purely 
on the index market price. That is, { }0miF p= . In the following, we discuss how the market price p 
incorporates decentralized information. 
3.3.1 The Index Market Price 
While the market price is determined by the market clearing mechanism that could vary according to 
different market microstructures, we focus on one type of market structure where the market maker 
responds to the aggregate net order by taking an opposite position. We assume that the market 
maker does not have any private information. Thus, to prevent economic loss, the market maker sets 
the index price as the expected value of the future payoff given the current aggregate net orders in 
the market.  
 
We assume that there are M risk-neutral informed traders in the market, which is composed of N 
retailers and N0 traders from outside the supply chain. That is, 0M N N= + . We do not distinguish 
among informed traders’ forecast abilities. That is, we assume all informed traders in the market, 
including retailers, observe i is x δ= + , ( )1~ 0,i N δτδ , for 1,2, ,i M= " . But this simplification will 
not affect the major model insights. We also assume that some uninformed traders submit a random, 
exogenous aggregate net order ( )1~ 0,N ωτω . Note that the noisy traders’ assumption incorporates 
all the unpredictable elements that may come from market participants’ random liquidation demands 
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or irrational behaviors. Similar assumptions have been used throughout the finance literature.  
 
The concept of Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) is the key theoretical concept that explains 
how individual traders’ information gets integrated into the market price. We provide the definition of 
REE in Appendix A. The following proposition states an informed trader’s equilibrium trading strategy 
and shows how the dispersed information is aggregated in the equilibrium market price. Guo et al. 
(2006) provided a complete proof of the results. 
 
Proposition 22: There exists a unique linear rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in which  
1)  An informed trader i adopts a linear trading strategy 0 1 2i io B B s B p= + + ; 
2) The equilibrium market price 0 1
1
M
i L
i
p A A s ω
=
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟= + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠∑ ; 
where A0, A1, B0, B1, B2, and L are constants. 
 
Therefore, the index price p can be viewed as a noise signal of the aggregated prediction 
1
M
i
i
s
=
∑ . The 
existence and uniqueness of the linear REE guarantee a one-to-one mapping from the dispersed 
market signals to the aggregate market price. L, which often represents market liquidity in the REE 
literature, reflects the precision of the information transformation. The larger the value of L, and/or the 
less the influence of ω ,  the more precise p is as an aggregate indicator of the useful signals.  
 
It is also worth noting that the index market price reflects the average signal 
1
1 M
i
i
s
M =
∑  rather than 
each individual signal. By law of large numbers, such a signal is “manipulation free” when the number 
of informed market participants is large. In other words, suppose one retailer submits an order 
( )0 1 2i i io B B s B pκ= + + +  intending to mislead the market using a disturbed signal i is κ+  
rather than the true signal is . By Proposition 2, the effect of this order on the final market price 
accuracy is discounted by a factor 1 /A M . We can easily show that, when M is large enough, one 
single trader’s effort to mislead the market price will be in vain. Given that the equilibrium market price 
is insensitive to one trader’s signal distortion, the trader will in fact be worse off if she deviates from 
the equilibrium trading strategy that maximizes her expected payoff. Hence, no one agent has an 
incentive to manipulate the market. Agents’ best strategy is to follow the one described in Proposition 
2. This shows that the market-based information revelation is incentive compatible. 
 
The aggregate forecasts revealed by the market price can be extremely accurate when the number of 
informed traders approaches infinity. To quantify this effect, we define price informativeness as 
( )
1
var |x pPI  . That is to say, the less variation of X is conditional on p, the more informative the index 
price p is.  We use the reciprocal to capture this relationship in the definition.  
 
Proposition 3:  The market price becomes more informative when the number of informed traders in 
the market increases, i.e., PI increases in M. Moreover, when the number of informed traders in the 
market approaches infinity, the index market price converges to the true value of the retail index, i.e., 
lim
M
PI→∞ = ∞  and limM p X→∞ = .  
 
Since price precision increases in the number of informed traders, informational efficiency rises as 
                                                     
2 Conjecturing and proving the existence and uniqueness of a linear REE is a standard technique in 
the financial economics literature. However, due to slightly different informational assumptions in the 
model setup, no available results can be directly applied. A complete proof of Propositions 2 and 3 
can be found in Guo et al. (2006). 
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more useful information is impounded in the market price. 
3.3.2 Value of the Index Market on Forecasting 
In this section, we show that the demand forecast generated by a specially designed index market is 
more accurate than the individual retailer’s own forecast (the decentralized supply chain scenario 
where no forecast information is shared). In addition, we show that the collective demand forecast 
can be as precise as that of an aggregate forecast (the aggregated supply chain scenario where all 
supply chain partners truthfully share their own demand forecasts). Finally, we show that it is possible 
that the overall prediction power of the supply chain partners improves because the prediction market 
has the ability to incorporate outside information sources. For example, if the useful information 
possessed by N0 informed outside traders dominates the noisy information possessed by those 
uninformed traders, then the open market’s prediction power will be greater than that of a closed 
supply chain forecast sharing model. 
 
Using the Bayesian rule of update, we can derive the respective means jiX  and variances 
1
j
iΓ
 of 
retailer i's forecasted demand distribution, for 1,2, ,i N= " , under the three supply chain models 
(i.e., , ,j a d mi= ). 
0
0 0
0 1
Na
i iN N i
X s sδ
δ δ
τ τ
τ τ τ τ+ + == + ∑ , 0 0 00di iX s sδδ δτ ττ τ τ τ+ += + , 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )0 2 2 20 0 0
1
01 1 1
v
v v v
Mmi
i i i LM M M
X s s sδ
δ δ δ
ττ τ ω
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
−
−+ + − + + − + + −= + + +  
where 
1
N
i j ij
s s s− = −∑ , ( )2 11 1Mv Lδ ωτ ττ −− + , and 201 1iai bN δ ετ τ τ+Γ = + , 201 1idi b δ ετ τ τ+Γ = + , 
( )
2
0
1 1
1
i
mi vi
b
Mδ ετ τ τ τ+ + −Γ = + . 
 
Since the prior demand distribution (before observing any signal si) is a normal distribution with mean 
0
0i i iX a b s= + and variance 
2
0 0
1 1i
i
b
ετ τΓ = + , by simple comparison we obtain the following result. 
 
Proposition 4: The index market-based forecasting yields the same mean but higher precision than 
the prior demand distribution, i.e., ( ) 0mii iE X X= , 0mii iΓ ≥ Γ . Furthermore, there are conditions 
under which the index market-based forecasting outperforms the aggregated forecasting, i.e., 
mi a
i iΓ ≥ Γ .3 
 
Proposition 4 demonstrates the demand forecasting accuracy under the COM framework. The index 
market-based forecasting not only improves upon the prior knowledge about the demand distribution, 
but may be more accurate than the aggregate forecast. This is because the market not only 
incorporates all the private signals from the retailers, but also integrates other information sources 
from the N0 outside traders. The more useful information that comes from outside traders, the better 
the COM framework is compared to the full-information benchmark where all the retailers truthfully 
share their private information.  
 
3.3.3 Value of Information Sharing on the Bullwhip Effect 
The bullwhip effect is a well-known informational problem in the supply chain represented by the 
observed increasing order variances from downstream partners in the supply chain (Lee et al., 1997). 
We show that improved demand forecasting reduces the retailers’ order variation and thus alleviates 
                                                     
3 Please refer to Guo et al. (2006) for a discussion of the specific conditions. Those conditions state when 
and how the useful information from outside the supply chain can contribute to improve the internal 
supply chain forecast accuracy. 
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the information distortion (e.g., the bullwhip effect) in the supply chain. 
 
It is easy to show that, in our newsvendor-based model, retailer i ’s optimal order quantity is 
determined by 
( )11 1 jj
i
j j
i ii i r
Q a b X ω−
Γ
= + + Φ − , for , ,j a d mi= .  
 
We see that variation of the retailer’s order quantity is proportional to its forecasting standard 
deviation.  Comparing the order quantities, we obtain the following result. 
 
Proposition 5: With the information revealed from the index market, the manufacturer can estimate 
each retailer’s order with more accuracy, i.e., ( ) ( )var | varmi di iQ p Q< . Moreover, when the index 
market is more liquid, the order variance decreases, i.e., ( )var |miiQ p  decreases as M increases. 
When the index market is extremely efficient, the order variance approaches 0, i.e., 
( ) ( )1lim var | var | ( ) 0mi a Ni i i i
M
Q p Q s =→∞ = = . 
 
Since the index market price is precise enough to forecast the macro uncertainty, retailers can more 
accurately forecast the macro economy and their own demand when making their order decisions. 
The index market-based forecast sharing helps reduce order variance from the retailers. The 
manufacturer can also benefit by making more accurate inferences about the expected aggregate 
orders from her contracted retailers. 
3.3.4 Value of COM on Supply Chain Efficiency 
The outsourced supply chain generates greater total system efficiency than the non-outsourced 
(decentralized) supply chain. Under certain conditions, COM could produce more accurate forecasts 
and greater economic gain than the aggregate supply chain solution (the full information benchmark). 
 
The total expected supply chain profit is determined by the sum of all supply chain partners’ expected 
profits. After simple algebraic manipulation, it can be expressed as:  
( ) ( ),0 0 0N N Nj j jj i ji i ii i iE E r c E Q rE Q= = =⎡ ⎤Π = Π = − − Ψ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑ , 
where ( ) ( )1, jd
i
t
j
i j iQ t dt
−
Γ ∞
Ψ = Φ∫  and ( )1 dj rt ω−= Φ , for , ,j a d mi= . 
 
Proposition 6: Under mild regularity conditions, the expected supply chain profit is higher under the 
index market coordination than that in the decentralized scenario, i.e., mi dE EΠ > Π . Moreover, the 
expected supply chain profit under the index market coordination approaches the full information 
benchmark when the number of retailers approaches infinity, i.e., lim limmi a
M N
E E→∞ →∞Π = Π . 
 
The traditional supply chain literature considers the incentive and coordination issues by viewing the 
supply chain as a closed system. Our proposed framework demonstrates the value of useful 
information from outside sources to increase overall supply chain efficiency. This framework is 
extremely suitable in situations where the number of supply chain partners is large.  
3.4 A Betting Market When Precision is Heterogeneous 
In some supply chain practices, the number of chain partners may not be large. In addition, they may 
have heterogeneous abilities to predict future uncertainty. That is, the reliability of each retailer’s 
private signal can be different due to retailers’ access to potentially different information sources. In 
this section, we revise the assumption on the information structure in the previous model to address 
this issue. Specifically, we assume that each retailer i obtains a private signal i is x δ= + , where 
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( )1~ 0,
i
i N τδ  are independent forecasting errors. iτ  is the precision of each private signal, which is 
different for each retailer. The larger the iτ , the less the variance of iδ and the more precise is the 
private forecast of retailer i.  
 
If all the retailers share their signals { } 1,2, ,i i Ns = "  honestly, and the precisions of those signals 
{ } 1,2, ,i i Nτ = "  are public information, we shall have that { } 0
0 0
1
1| , ~ ,
N
i ii
N N
i ii i
sN
i i iX s N
τ
τ τ
τ =
= =
=
⎛ ⎞∑ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ , 
following Normal Learning Theorem (DeGroot, 1970). It is obvious that an efficient aggregation of all 
the retailers’ private forecasts is a weighted average of all the retailers’ signals { } 1,2, ,i i Ns = " and that 
the weights are proportional to the precision of their signals { } 1,2, ,i i Nτ = " .  Therefore, in order to get 
the best aggregation of the signals, not only shall each retailer share her private forecast is , she 
shall also reveal her reliability iτ . However, the market mechanism discussed in Section 3.2 has a 
reward structure that is based only on is and is generally unable to distinguish the precision iτ . After 
all, the signal is just a “guess” about the future uncertainty. Two retailers may get two signals of the 
same value, while one is extremely confident but the other is not so sure about it. A mechanism 
needs to be specifically designed to elicit both is  and iτ  from a retailer.  
 
Recall that in our index market design there is a one-to-one mapping between the trading volume and 
a trader’s signal. If the task of information aggregation is two dimensional (both the signal and the 
precision), then theoretically we need two market parameters. To fulfill this task, we adopt the market 
mechanism proposed by Fang et al. (2007). The mechanism was designed based on the popular 
saying, “putting your money where your mouth is.” Specifically, the information third party can run a 
betting market to allow each participant i to submit a report ri on the possible future value of X and 
place a certain amount of money as a bet on his or her report, Bi. The task of the third party is to 
design a reward function ( ), ,i if r B X  paid to each of the participants, which is contingent on the 
corresponding report and bet, ( ),i ir B . To effectively aggregate the information, the reward function 
should:  
1. induce each participant to report truthfully her private forecast of the future value of X, that is, 
[ ]|i ir E X s= ; 
2. elicit the precision of each bettor’s private signal is , that is, ( )i iB g τ=  where ( )g ⋅  is 
monotonic. 
 
One of the candidate reward functions satisfying the above requirement is a quadratic loss function 
( ) ( )( )12 2, , 2i i iif r B X B r Xτ= − − , where the participant maximizes the payoff when the report 
coincides with the future value of X.  
 
For each risk-neutral retailer, the overall maximization problem is to decide the report, bet, and future 
order quantity so as to maximize her aggregate expected payoff from both the betting market and 
local commodity markets. Since all the retailers are risk neutral, the two decisions are independent. 
Proposition 7 shows the best strategy of each bettor.  
 
Proposition 7: The bettor i’s optimal betting strategy is [ ] 0 0
0
* | i i
i
s s
i ir E X s
τ τ
τ τ
+
+= =  and 
( )
2
22
00
* i
i
iB
τ
τ τ τ+=  with a positive expected payoff ( )
2
2
0
i
i
τ
τ τ+ . 
 
A rational bettor will bet a positive amount of money as long as her precision is positive ( 0iτ > ). In 
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addition, the bet increases when the signal is more precise (i.e., as iτ  increases). A bettor with no 
relevant information ( iτ =0) will not place a bet. Therefore, the market can effectively aggregate all 
the relevant information without generating noisy traders. 
 
Proposition 8: Based on bettor i's report and bet ( ),i ir B , the market maker can distill the bettor’s 
private information and precision using the following formulae 
1
2
0 0
1
2
0
ii
i
B r s
i
B
s
τ
τ
+ −=  and 0 1
2
0
0
1 i
i
B
τ
τ
τ τ=
−
− . 
 
This shows that the betting mechanism will reveal both the bettor’s signal and its precision. The 
information can then aggregate all { } 1, Ni i is τ = , achieving the objective of the two dimensional 
information aggregation.  
4. Discussion and Implementation 
The proposed COM framework advances supply chain information coordination through its ability to 
aggregate dispersed information under different informational assumptions and from a variety of 
sources. A market mechanism is important, as its reward structure provides an incentive for retailers 
to reveal their private forecasts.  In the following, we first compare the two market mechanisms that 
we discussed above. Then we demonstrate the role of the information third party and discuss the 
benefits and costs of implementation.   
4.1 Comparison of Market Mechanisms  
The index market is an open system. Its ability to extract and aggregate valuable information from 
outside of the supply chain is its major advantage. Accordingly, this market mechanism is suitable in a 
forecasting environment where the subject is not sensitive, and the subject itself attracts participation 
from outside experts. Some macroeconomic variables tend to be insensitive subjects. For example, 
economic indicators such as the U.S. gross domestic product and retail sales fall in this category. 
Moreover, these macro level factors generate public attention easily, so traders outside of the supply 
chain can contribute to the information aggregation and improve the market’s prediction power. 
Therefore, this market mechanism has the potential to generate forecasts that are more accurate 
than those of any individual retailer or what can be obtained through a closed supply chain system.  
 
Compared to the index market mechanism, a betting mechanism has an advantage over aggregate 
information when the sources of dispersed information are not evenly distributed. In addition, the 
information third party can control all the bets and reports that are not observable to other bettors. 
This provides a secure way to incorporate outside information without reviewing the aggregate 
prediction. The betting market mechanism is especially useful when the forecasting subject is 
sensitive and the dissemination of information should be restricted within the supply chain. Very often, 
such a sensitive forecasting subject does not attract attention from the public, and thus it is 
impractical to trade in an open market environment. Therefore, the betting mechanism is suitable for 
restricted participation when the supply chain partners have heterogeneous forecasting capabilities 
and some retailers have better information than others. 
4.2 Benefits of Market Implementation 
In addition to the various benefits discussed in Section 3.1., another aspect of the market-based 
incentive alignment is its immunity to the moral hazard problem in traditional contract design and 
coordination (Grossman and Hart, 1983). For example, as a risk sharing mechanism, a buy-back 
contract allows retailers to sell back unsold products at a pre-specified salvage value to the 
manufacturer. The retailer may not put much effort into selling products if the promotion cost is higher 
than the guaranteed salvage value. The market-contingent contract can solve this moral hazard 
problem, since it is written on the retail index, which is highly correlated with the retailers’ demand, but 
retailers still have to bear the residual risk of their own uncertain market demand.  
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Understanding the tradeoff between risk and incentive has been a complex task (Tirole, 1998). The 
market-based framework extends the range of information sharing beyond the traditional supply chain 
boundaries. It also opens the door for other market innovations including the introduction of securities 
and derivatives for the purpose of managing corporate risk.  By separating the information flow from 
the physical product flow, retailers may hedge their own operational risk effectively using financial 
instruments available in the information market. Retailers’ self-selected risk management may be 
more effective than relying on the construction of overly complex and hard-to-implement contracts to 
achieve the coordination. 
4.3 Costs of Market Implementation 
The information third party plays a crucial role in successfully managing the information supply chain. 
The third party should be trusted by all the chain members to share information truthfully via the 
designed reward mechanism. In constructing an open market, the information third party should also 
be capable of understanding the supply chain information structure, investigating the correlations of 
the retailers’ demands, and identifying the macro factor to forecast. In choosing an effective market 
mechanism, the third party also needs to estimate how the private information is distributed among all 
the chain partners and whether outside information sources are needed. The information third party is 
then able to design the appropriate type of prediction market and to deliver the aggregate prediction 
with the desired solution quality. 
 
However, there will always be costs associated with the third party, for example, the cost to hire such 
a third party and the cost for each company to communicate with the third party. In order to manage 
an electronic prediction market, the supply chain partners would have to provide the budget to invest 
in the hardware and software to develop and support the market function. However, with the 
decreasing cost of the IT infrastructure and the increasing popularity and acceptance of prediction 
markets, such costs are becoming more affordable. One possibility is that supply chain partners share 
the cost. Another possibility is that the manufacturer or whoever benefits the most from the final 
prediction provides the subsidy.  
 
The cost of running a prediction market varies depending on the choice of market mechanism. An 
index market discussed in Section 3.2 is essentially a zero-sum market, meaning that the market 
maker (generally the information third party) does not provide explicit compensation and expects no 
profit (or loss). The traders purchase contracts expecting to make money from less-informed traders 
(generally called the noisy traders). The presence of noisy traders can therefore motivate informed 
traders to participate in the market. However, their random orders may reduce the overall precision of 
the equilibrium price. If adopting the betting mechanism described in Section 3.3, the market maker 
designs the betting contract so that each participant can expect a positive payoff if she has quality 
information. The more precise the information source, the higher payoff the participant can expect to 
get. The reward mechanism lures traders to research and improve their information precision. The 
market maker, therefore, has to compensate for the cost of information acquisition in order to get 
more precise information. Fortunately, the compensation costs can be controlled by the design of 
contract parameters. Fang et al. (2007) has proven that the gain from getting more accurate 
predictions can always exceed the overall compensation cost, if the contract parameters are chosen 
appropriately. 
 
Being aware of the potential cost associated with the collective outsourcing, supply chain members 
must jointly decide whether the gain in efficiency will overcome the cost and how the cost should be 
shared among the partners. The choice could vary in different scenarios. Our discussion attempts to 
provide a general guideline for selecting who will participate and how the collective outsourcing 
activities work. 
5. Conclusion 
Parallel to the physical supply chain, and fundamentally integral to it, are the information supply 
chains that help achieve business objectives by enhancing critical business processes. By separating 
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the information flow from the physical order flow in the supply chain, we are able to find a more 
efficient way of managing the information supply chain that brings a number of important supply chain 
benefits. Specifically, we propose a market-based framework centralizing the entire supply chain 
demand forecasting task by collectively outsourcing to a market that supports information-intensive 
business process reengineering. Our outsourcing market can be organized as an open, real market 
that trades futures contracts based on a properly identified macroeconomic factor. It can also be 
designed as a closed betting market with pre-specified reward structures. 
 
The two market mechanisms represent two radically new forms of information sharing to deal with 
different supply chain information management challenges. The index market has the potential to 
extract information from outside the supply chain and provides a foundation for hedging other 
economic risks on an aggregate level. The betting market mechanism is particularly powerful in 
eliciting private information with different reliabilities. Depending on the characteristics of forecast 
subjects and their information sharing needs, an information third party can choose the proper 
mechanism to fulfill the outsourcing task.   
 
This paper examines new opportunities in supply chain process innovation. We present an alternative 
outsourcing model that has some important potential benefits. First, we focus on the economic value 
derived from a collective knowledge base by considering outsourcing the demand forecast functions 
that enable supply chain business process reengineering. Second, collaborative forecasts can be 
implicitly elicited and effectively coordinated in the marketplace without costly individual contract 
negotiation and enforcement. Incentives for different supply chain entities to share private information 
are properly aligned in our market-based framework. In addition, collective outsourcing is more 
efficient in that it not only pools knowledge from individual firms, but elicits information from other 
knowledgeable experts who may not necessarily be included in the outsourcing contract. Finally, the 
market-based framework opens up opportunities for other business innovations (Hull, 1993; Shiller, 
1993). The trading platform has the IT option value that can be fully leveraged to implement other 
financial innovations such as trading various derivative contracts for supply chain partners to hedge 
their operational risks.  
 
We contribute to supply chain information systems design by bridging the current research gap 
between collective outsourcing and supply chain coordination. Future work could extend the 
informational role of markets to their function of hedging firms’ operational risk from the supply chain 
risk management perspective. 
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Appendix 
A. REE in the Macro Index Market 
We assume that each informed trader 1,2, ,i M= " , obtains a private signal i is x δ= + , where 
( )1~ 0,i N δτδ  and places an order io  while taking the price information into account to maximize her 
expected return from the index market.  
 ( )( )[ ]max | ,
i
i i
o
E X p y o s p−  (A1) 
 
There are also some uninformed traders whose aggregate net order is random and exogenously 
given, i.e., ( )1~ 0,N ωτω .4 A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is defined by two components.  
First, a trading strategy io , for 1,2, ,i M= " , that solves the above maximization problem given 
pricing function ( )p y . Second, a pricing function ( )p y  such that given the trading strategy io , 
1,2, ,i M= " , we have 
 ( )
1
|
M
ii
p y E X y o ω=⎡ ⎤= = +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  (A2) 
where 
1
M
ii
y o ω== +∑  is the aggregate demand. 
 
The system of equations (A1) and (A2) collectively define the REE in the macro index market. 
B. Proofs of Propositions 
Sketch of Proofs of Propositions 1 & 6: 
The expected supply chain profits under three supply chain structures are 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
1
01 1
d
d
i
d
d d
tN Nd d
ii i
tN N r
i i di i
E r c E Q r t dt
r c a b s t t dt
−
= = Γ −∞
−
= = Τ Τ −∞
⎡ ⎤Π = − − Φ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= − + − − Φ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ ∫
∑ ∑ ∫
 
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )
1
1 1
1
01 1
|
mi
mi
i
mi
mi mi
tN Nmi mi
p ii i
tN N r
i i mii i
E E r c E Q p r t dt
r c a b s Et E t dt
−
= = Γ −∞
−
= = Τ Τ −∞
⎡ ⎤Π = − − Φ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − + − − Φ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ ∫
∑ ∑ ∫
 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) { } ( )
1 2
1 2
1
, , , 1 21 1
1
0 , , ,1 1
| , , ,
a
N a
i
a
a aN
tN Na a
s s s i Ni i
tN N r
i i a s s si i
E E r c E Q s s s r t dt
r c a b s t E t dt
−
= = Γ −∞
−
= = Τ Τ −∞
⎡ ⎤Π = − − Φ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − + − − Φ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ ∫
∑ ∑ ∫
"
"
"
 
where 1 1
1j j
i
N
i=Τ Γ
= ∑ , for , ,j a d mi= . Therefore,  
( )( ) ( ) ( )d mid mid mi d mit tt Etmi d r rpE r c t dt E t dt− −Τ Τ Τ Τ−∞ −∞⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤Π −Π = − − + Φ − Φ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫ ∫  
                                                     
4 The noisy traders’ assumption incorporates all the unpredictable elements which may come from 
agents’ random liquidation demands or irrational behaviors. The random supply provided by noisy traders 
is crucial in providing the informed traders with proper incentives to participate in the market. In 
equilibrium, informed retailers will earn positive expected profits at the expense of the noisy traders’ 
expected losses since the market is a zero-sum game.  
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( )( ) ( ) { } ( )1 2, , ,d ad ad a d aNt tt Eta d r rs s sE r c t dt E t dt− −Τ Τ Τ Τ−∞ −∞⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤Π −Π = − − + Φ − Φ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫ ∫"  
 
Further manipulation of the terms in  a dE ⎡ ⎤Π −Π⎣ ⎦  and mi dE ⎡ ⎤Π −Π⎣ ⎦  we can show that and 
a dE EΠ > Π  and mi dE EΠ > Π under mild regularity condition ( ) 2min ,mi d rw w c> > . Further 
discussion on the condition and complete proofs on the supply chain efficiency property can be found 
in Guo et al. (2006). 
 
Finally, lim limmi ai i
M N
E X Xω→∞ →∞= , and lim lim
mi a
i i
M N→∞ →∞Γ = Γ . The same forecasts yield the same 
expected supply chain profits.  This concludes the proof of Proposition 6. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 22 2 0 0 00 02 1 1var var vari i ib b bd di i i iQ b X s δδ δ δ δδ δτ τ ττ τ τ τ ττ τ τ τ ++ += = = + =  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 00
2
12 2 1 1
1
var | var | p
p
Mmi mi
i i i i
M
Q p b X p b δ
δδ
τ τ
τ ττ τ τ
− −
+ + −
⎡ ⎤= = +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
where ( )2 11Mp Lδ ωτ ττ −+ , L is a constant market parameter (Guo et al., 2006). 
 
Comparing equations yields ( ) ( )var var |d mii iQ Q p≥  with equality holds when M=1. So 
( ) ( )var var |d mii iQ Q p≥  when 2M ≥ . Proof of the asymptotic property requires substitution of 
related market parameters. We omit its proof here. 
 
Proof of Proposition 7: 
Given the reward function ( ) ( )( )12 2, , 2 1i i iif r B X B r x= − − , an agent maximizes expected payoff 
by choosing the optimal report and bet ( ),i ir B : 
( ) ( )[ ]
,
max , , | ,
i i
i i i i i
r B
E f r B X B s τ− . 
 
The expected payoff is expressed as:  
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )
( )[ ][ ] ( )[ ]
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1 1
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2 2 2
0
1 1
2 2
0
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1 2
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τ τ τ
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+
⎡ ⎤− = − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
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≤ − −
= − −
 
with the maximum obtained when ( )[ ] 0 0
0
* | , i i
i
s s
i i ir E X s
τ τ
τ ττ ++= = . To determine the optimal bet, 
simply taking first order derivative on 
1
2
iB  of the above equation and solve for iB , we obtain 
( )
2
22
00
* i
i
iB
τ
τ τ τ+= .    
 
Proof of Proposition 8: 
Solving equations in Proposition 7 for ( ),i is τ  we have the results immediately. 
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C. Notation Table 
Table 1: Mathematic Notations 
 
0,1,2, ,i N= "  Index of the manufacturer ( 0i = ) and the retailers ( 1,2, ,i N= " )  
, , ,j a d mi mb=  Index of different supply chain coordination scenarios. a = aggregated 
forecast sharing scenario; d = decentralized forecasting scenario; m = 
market coordination scenario (mi denotes index market; mb denotes betting 
market). 
iD  Retailer i’s local market demand 
iε  Idiosyncratic demand risk associated with retailer i  
1
ετ
 Variance of the local idiosyncratic demand risk 
ai, bi Retailer-specific parameters in the demand function 
X The macro-economic factor that drives the retailers’ underlying demand 
s0 The expected value of X in the common prior belief 
0τ  The precision of the prior knowledge about X 
si Retailer i’s private forecast of X 
iδ  Retailer i’s forecast error of X 
iτ  Pecision of retailer i’s private forecast (reciprocal of ( )var iδ ) 
0
iX  Mean of retailer i’s prior demand distribution 
0
1
jΓ
 Variance of retailer i's prior demand distribution 
j
iX  Retailer i’s forecast mean of the demand distribution under scenario j 
1
j
iΓ
 Retailer i’s forecast variance of the demand distribution under scenario j 
jw  The wholesale price charged by the manufacturer in scenario j. 
r Retail price charged by all retailers 
c Unit production cost for the manufacturer 
j
iF  The information set available to supply chain member i in scenario j.  
j
iQ  Retailer i's order quantity to the manufacturer in scenario j. 
oi Informed trader i’s order in the index market. 
ω  Aggregate random net order submitted by uninformed noisy traders. 
1
ωτ
 Variance of the aggregate random net order from uninformed traders. 
L Market liquidity measure 
p Equilibrium market price of the retail index. 
PI Price informativeness measure 
jEΠ  The expected overall supply chain profit in scenario j. 
j
iEΠ  The expected supply chain member i’s profit in scenario j. 
ri Report by retailer i on the future value of X. 
Bi Bet placed by retailer i on her report. 
( ), ,i if r B X  The reward function in the betting market. 
N Total number of retailers. 
N0 Total number of outside informed traders. 
M Total number of informed traders in the index market. 0M N N= + . 
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